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November 2, 2006
DAN RATHER: Thanks for doing this.
ALBERTO MORA: My pleasure.
DAN RATHER: It's a pleasure to be with you.
Tell me your story. Walk us through briefly how and when you got onto the
Guantánamo story that later consumed so much of your time.
ALBERTO MORA: I was in my office at the Department of the Navy in late
2002, late one afternoon, when the Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service, Dave Brant, came to me, and he said that some of his people who were
stationed in Guantánamo had heard—not witnessed, but had heard—that there was
some detainee abuse going on, and did I want to hear more about this. I said I
felt I had to.
Then we arranged for a larger meeting the following day. Dave came back in
with several of his senior agents. I invited the Navy two-star admiral who was
the Judge Advocate of the Navy to attend, along with a few others. Dave Brant
and his people told us a story of detainee abuse in Guantánamo. It was limited
to one or just a few individuals, and they provided us some fragments of
transcripts that indicated clearly that there was abusive treatment going on.
They also said that the rumor in Guantánamo was that this abuse had been
authorized by higher authorities in Washington, but they had not seen those
authorizations.
My reaction was that this was unlawful activity, it was profoundly contrary
to our national interests, contrary to our interests in the war on terror, and
that it would be a scandal if in fact it was not controlled. I promised the
individuals I would try to find out more about this and see what I could do.
That's how it started.
DAN RATHER: Let me back up for a moment. Your job at the time was?
ALBERTO MORA: I was General Counsel of the Department of the Navy,
which made me the chief legal officer of the Navy and Marine Corps.
DAN RATHER: And your direct superior?
ALBERTO MORA: Was the Secretary of the Navy.
DAN RATHER: So that's the position you were in when they came to your
office and said, "Some of the men are worried about what's going on in
Guantánamo?"
ALBERTO MORA: That's right.
DAN RATHER: What happened next?
ALBERTO MORA: I tried to track down these authorities they had
discussed. I called the Army General Counsel, who was a good friend—
DAN RATHER: The Army General Counsel?
ALBERTO MORA:
That's right. What is called Executive Agent for Detainee Treatment, meaning
that they had the lead among all the services for providing logistical and other
kinds of support to the combatant commanders as part of the operations in the
war on terror. So I knew that if anybody would know about these authorities it
was likely to be the Army chain of command.
So I called this individual. I said, "I'm hearing that there are abuses of
detainees in Guantánamo. Do you know anything about this?" He said, "I know a
lot about this. Come on down." I almost fell out of my chair, because you place
those kinds of phone calls and you never get a positive answer—at least I wasn't
expecting to receive one.
I went down to his office, met with him, and he pushed across the papers, a
stack of documents that started at the very bottom with a request from the
commanding officer of the Guantánamo prison for the use of certain
"counter-resistant interrogation techniques," as they were labeled, three
different categories of interrogation techniques.
The documents indicated that it went up the chain of command, through SOUTHCOM [the U.S.
Southern Command] in Miami, up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, and
then the top document was a transmittal memo from the Department of Defense
General Counsel to Secretary Rumsfeld
asking for authority to engage or apply certain of these interrogation
techniques. The documents had Secretary Rumsfeld's signature, indicating
approval of some, not all, of the techniques.
DAN RATHER: What was your reaction?
ALBERTO MORA: As I thumbed through the documents, I was looking for
language of limitation. Specifically, what I was looking for was a sentence in
there that said "You may apply these techniques only to the point at which they
reach the level of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment," which arguably
would have made all of this permissible and legal. But those words weren't in
there. It was a completely unlimited set of discretion. As such, I felt that
this document was unlawful.
But I also felt throughout my initial review that this was all a mistake,
meaning that up and down the chain of command nobody had really thought through
seriously enough what the implications of the authority requested and granted
was, and that had they known they would never have given this kind of
authority.
DAN RATHER: So that's what was going through your head at the
time?
ALBERTO MORA: Right.
DAN RATHER: Did you or did you not say to yourself, "This looks to me
like big trouble?" Or was it, "I don't like the looks of this, but we can
probably be okay with it?"
ALBERTO MORA: I never said the last thing. It was big trouble from the
start. I mean this was authorizing what I thought was unlawful activity, an
activity that, because of its very nature, would become scandalous. It was bound
to create a severe public outcry and backlash were it ever known that in fact
the United States was engaged in this practice.
I felt it would also have serious foreign policy consequences to us. I
thought it would impair our ability to fight the war on terror successfully
because our allies would not tolerate this kind of conduct.
There was
nothing good about that set of documents in my view.
DAN RATHER: And where did you go from there and where did the story go
from there?
ALBERTO MORA: I took the document stack to the Department of Defense
General Counsel, who had sent it to Secretary Rumsfeld for his authorization,
and put the document down on the desk. It was a lengthy conversation, lasted
about an hour. The critical point was my telling the General Counsel that these
documents authorize torture. His immediate response was, "No, they don't."
Then I urged him to think through a little more carefully about these
specific interrogation techniques. For example, deprivation of light—my question
to him was, "What does this mean? Deprivation of light for an hour, a day, a
week, a month, until he goes blind?" Deprivation of sound—the same sort of
questions. Detainee-specific phobia techniques—what are these; the rats, the
bats, the snakes? Lock somebody up in a coffin—for how long? Clearly, each one
of these techniques individually, and certainly in combination, if applied in
certain ways, could easily reach the level of torture.
That was the argument I made. There were other arguments as well. I left the
office thinking—in fact, being certain—that as soon as I would leave the office,
calls would be made to the Secretary and actions would be taken to rescind the
authorizations.
DAN RATHER: And were they?
ALBERTO MORA: Nope, not initially.
The following day, I went to
Miami on a Christmas vacation. During that vacation, I continued to get reports
from NCIS that the abuse was still continuing in Guantánamo.
DAN RATHER: NCIS is?
ALBERTO MORA: The Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
It struck me then that this was all still a big mistake but it had not been
inadvertent.
I went back to Washington. My staff, the Navy JAG [Judge Advocate
General] staff, had been conducting greater in-depth legal research and policy
research into the implications of these authorizations. I went back to see the
General Counsel with the same and some new arguments as to why we shouldn't be
doing this kind of activity.
DAN RATHER: I want to refer to things that I think you have said
before, but—correct me if I'm wrong—you believed that Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld's authorization of certain interrogation methods and techniques
amounted to condoning torture?
ALBERTO MORA: They could condone torture.
DAN RATHER: And why was that your belief?
ALBERTO MORA: Because there was no limitation on the scope of the
effect that these techniques could achieve. What you would hope to see in those
kinds of documents would in fact be limitations on the degree to which you could
go and apply the techniques.
DAN RATHER: Help us understand. In
abuse or mistreatment, cruelty, and torture, what distinctions do you make
between abuse, mistreatment, cruelty, torture? Give us a rough definition of
terms.
ALBERTO MORA: It is very difficult to define. One can say the classic
definition, which is that cruelty is the imposition of severe physical or mental
pain or suffering on a person.
Torture is an extreme version of cruelty. The
distinction is important because there is a legal distinction, both in domestic
law and international law, between cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, on
the one hand, and then torture, on the other.
Torture is banned under international treaty conventions and U.S. domestic
legislation and is regarded to be a universal crime. Many nations believe that
there is universal jurisdiction against anybody engaged in the application of
torture. Pinochet, for example, was apprehended and tried in Spain and
Great Britain because it was alleged that he had committed torture on a number
of Chilean individuals during his tenure as president of Chile.
Now, cruelty is barred under U.S. domestic legislation. But the international
prohibition of this is less certain, even though the Geneva Conventions, for
example, do also bar the application of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
But because there is a distinction, it is important to keep that distinction in
mind, and that distinction has played an important role in the debate in this
country as to how detainees should be treated.
To my mind, it is unfortunate that many people have classified all of this as
torture, because it is entirely possible somebody may not be applying torture,
and say he is not applying torture, but nonetheless be applying cruel treatment
to detainees.
In my view, the standard which we subscribe to as Americans constitutionally,
as part of our values, as part of our legislation, is that we do not treat
anybody cruelly. That is the basis and part of the foundations of our democracy,
certainly the basis for our legal system.
DAN RATHER: Excuse me. Keeping in mind that by your definition cruelty
is bad, it's terrible—but torture is worse?
ALBERTO MORA: Torture is worse.
And then, complicating matters even further, whether something is cruelty or
torture is always specific to the individual. You might have an eighty-year-old
grandmother, and mild treatment might be considered by her as torturous. If you
have a middleweight prizefighter in peak condition sitting in the chair
undergoing exactly the same treatment, his tolerance for that kind of abuse
would be much, much higher. So all of this will depend on the individual and
what the effects are on that person.
DAN RATHER: You have spoken about crossing the line of cruelty. Where
is the line?
ALBERTO MORA: It's difficult to say. This is one of those terms in the
law that does not lend itself to a very precise, mathematical definition. Which
is not to say that the boundary doesn't exist, because there are many terms in
the law that have somewhat vague terms. It's almost like the definition of
pornography, that you know it when you see it. There comes a certain point where
the application of certain treatment to individuals becomes so abusive that then
most reasonable people would say it is either cruel, or even becomes torturous,
treatment.
DAN RATHER: Let me pause and get the chain of command
straight. You were Counsel for the Navy. You answer to the Secretary of the
Navy. The Secretary of the Navy answers to whom?
ALBERTO MORA: The Secretary of Defense.
DAN RATHER: Directly to the Secretary of Defense?
ALBERTO MORA: Right.
DAN RATHER: But you mentioned the Chief Counsel for the Defense
Department. Would he have been your superior?
ALBERTO MORA: Not really. The chain of command is from the President
to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders in times of war. So
military operations now in Iraq, for example, answer to this chain of command.
The Secretary of the Navy is not engaged in military operations, so he is not in
the chain of command for those kinds of purposes.
All of the military services are engaged in the training, equipping, and
organizing of the military services. We provide combat-ready forces to the
Secretary of Defense and to the combatant commanders.
However, the Secretary of the Navy's authorities stem from the Secretary of
Defense, so the Secretary of the Navy is responsible and acts under the
authority, control, and direction of the Secretary of Defense.
The Department of Defense General Counsel could, acting under the Secretary's
authorities, give me instructions as Navy General Counsel, which I will be bound
to follow for these very reasons.
DAN RATHER: You said almost from the beginning you thought this was
not just trouble but big trouble, and you went back and you shared that with
your superior?
ALBERTO MORA: Right.
DAN RATHER: Who shared it with the superiors above him?
ALBERTO MORA: My superior told me to use my judgment. When I went back
and talked to Secretary England, who was transitioning to the Department of
Homeland Security, he acknowledged what I told him. I indicated to him what I
intended to do, which was to raise the matter and seek it to be abandoned by DoD
[the Department of Defense], and he gave me authority to go ahead using my own
judgment.
DAN RATHER: And you did that?
ALBERTO MORA: That's exactly what I did.
DAN RATHER: And what happened?
ALBERTO MORA: As I mentioned, I went to Mr. Haynes once. Nothing
happened after the first visit, for a period of two weeks plus. I came back to
the Pentagon after my Christmas vacation and raised the matter again with him at
length, providing other reasons why this could not be done.
For example, there is the fact that this behavior was criminal behavior under
most European jurisdictions. These European countries were our allies in the war
on terror, or we wished them to become our allies in the war on terror. But I
felt that their involvement in these kinds of activities would be hindered, or
made even impossible, because they would always be questioning whether or not
any activity they would get into on detainee treatment may not be aiding and
abetting in what would be considered criminal activity within their own
jurisdictions.
Also, these very interrogation techniques have been analyzed by the European Court of Human
Rights, for example, and held to be cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
which was classified as illegal.
These policies also implicitly repeal our nation's historic commitment to
human rights.
So there was a whole battery of reasons, ranging both from
the law, to foreign policy, to security policy, all of which argued that a
policy of cruelty was not in our best interests. I made that argument to the
General Counsel. Ultimately, nothing happened then either.
About January 15th of that year—this was 2003—I went to the General Counsel
again and gave him a draft memorandum, which I proposed to sign and send out
that afternoon, stating that these techniques constituted torture. After he had
reviewed the memorandum, he called me and he said that he had good news: that he
had talked to Secretary Rumsfeld about it, and that Secretary Rumsfeld was
prepared to rescind those authorities. In fact, the Secretary did rescind those
authorities that day.
DAN RATHER: It turns out that the
Administration either would not or could not see it the way that you saw it. Is
that a fair assessment?
ALBERTO MORA: I think it's probably a fair assessment. But I think the
historical record is not entirely clear. I know many would disagree with me in
saying that. I think many would say that the historical record is amply clear on
this. But I don't think it is exactly clear.
DAN RATHER: But in this area what are the major questions? You say you
would agree with it as a general proposition but you think in detail history may
prove it wrong. What are the major questions for history?
ALBERTO MORA: There were two channels through which abusive treatment
occurred. One was initially in the Department of Defense channels, operational
military forces. The other was in the intelligence channels. I think the record
is clear that many of these high-value detainees were held by intelligence
agencies and were interrogated by intelligence agencies. I think the record is
now also pretty clear that requests for authority to apply these kinds of
treatments went up, certainly to the White House, from both channels. We're not
certain what kind of authorities the intelligence agencies received.
I know that Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded those harsh interrogation techniques
in early 2003. And yet, after that there were authorizations issued to certain
military commanders stating that, although these techniques were banned,
individuals had discretion to come back to the Secretary and seek approval of
their application and he would consider those. The record isn't clear whether
those applications were sought and received, and the record isn't clear as to
what happened with the intelligence channels.
I think what the historical
record will show is that abuse fell into various different categories. Some
abuse was expressly authorized by the highest authorities. I think some abuse
occurred as a result of, perhaps, lack of leadership, confusing signals being
sent out, lack of adequate command and control on the part of military and other
kinds of authorities.
And I think some abuse occurred despite the best efforts of everybody in
command to prevent this from occurring. For example, in Iraq the Administration
has always been of the view, or has taken the position, that Geneva Convention
rules applied, and of course they forbid the application of cruel treatment to
all detainees. And yet, Abu Ghraib occurred and other types of abuses
occurred.
So where does each specific instance of abuse fall in these various
categories? I think it would span the gamut. But it is enough to say that for
some detainees the United States government authorized and applied a policy of
cruelty.
DAN RATHER: You came to that conclusion when?
ALBERTO MORA: I came to that conclusion after Abu Ghraib.
DAN RATHER: Why then?
ALBERTO MORA: Because in the intervening time Secretary Rumsfeld had
rescinded the authorization of techniques; and the DoD General Counsel had
written a letter to Senator Patrick Leahy which spoke for the Administration,
and the letter said that the United States not only did not apply torture, it
did not apply cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. I wrote an email to the
General Counsel after I saw that and I congratulated him, because I felt this
was exactly where our nation should be, and I told him I was proud to be on
America's team.
Also, I had heard from the agents at the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
that the abuses at Guantánamo had stopped, and I had not received any further
reports of abusive treatment, until after Abu Ghraib then opened up what in fact
was a much broader pattern of abuse within the U.S. government.
DAN RATHER: What else did that tell you? You said up until Abu Ghraib
you had some doubt as to what the situation was and after that you reached your
conclusion.
ALBERTO MORA: What it told me is summarized by the statement, that for
a period the United States had adopted a policy of cruelty. To me that is a
damning statement, because it is contrary to everything we stand for, it is
subversive of our principal values, it is destructive of our constitutional
order, and it is counterproductive in the war on terror and our foreign
policy.
DAN RATHER: To those persons, and there are some, people who love
their country as much as you and I do—that's not our issue—but to the people who
say, "Even if that's so, in the wake of 9/11, cruel acts beget cruel acts"—a
version of "I don't like it, but the country probably had to do it in order to
defend itself"—you would say what?
ALBERTO MORA: I would say that if we thought it through a little more
carefully, we would see how destructive such a policy would be of our nation.
Our country, our Constitution, our set of beliefs, is based upon the premise of
the overriding importance of human dignity. It is because we believe in the
importance of human dignity that the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and
the jurisprudence of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibits cruel treatment to
individuals.
If you can apply cruel treatment to an individual, such as a 9/11 hijacker,
then it means that the statement that our forefathers premised the Constitution
on, which is that all persons have inalienable rights, which would include the
right to be free from cruel treatment, was a false statement. And if that was a
false statement, then the underpinnings for our Constitution start to
dissolve.
But beyond that, I would answer the individual by saying that the application
of cruelty has made us weaker, has made us less able to defend ourselves, in the
war on terror.
Now, why is that? The reason is because in this particular war, where the
adversary is broadly dispersed in many different countries, we need by
definition a broad coalition. Our traditional allies all have laws that make it
a criminal activity to apply cruelty. These individuals in these nations have
not been able to cooperate with us as we would have wished because their
cooperation in cruel treatment is a criminal act under their legislation. So it
has inhibited the formation and maintenance of a broad-based coalition to fight
the war on terror, and it would continue to have this effect to the extent that
the United States continues to pursue a policy of cruelty.
DAN RATHER: I want to get back to your story. By the time Abu Ghraib
happens, we are at what time and you are at what place in your military
career?
ALBERTO MORA: This would have been about my third year in the
Pentagon. I was still Department of the Navy General Counsel. I would have about
another year and a half to go before I would leave the Department of the
Navy.
DAN RATHER: And your rank was?
ALBERTO MORA: It was equivalent to a four-star admiral, although I was
a civilian of course.
DAN RATHER: I understand.
What happened after Abu Ghraib with you?
ALBERTO MORA: After Abu Ghraib, then the debate became more acute as
to these kinds of policies. The investigations were launched inside the
Department of Defense and there was increased debate within the Pentagon as to
whether or not we would engage in these kinds of policies.
I should say also that there was a lot of confusion, confusion and a lack of
information, within the upper reaches of the Department of the Navy and
elsewhere as to precisely what had been authorized and who was responsible for
what.
My activities at that time as they related to detainees were involved in the
creation of what are called combatant status review tribunals, to assess whether
or not the detainees in Guantánamo were properly classified as unlawful enemy
combatants, and also the establishment of the administrative review boards to
help reassess them on an annual basis concerning dangerousness and whether they
should continue to be held.
My involvement also extended to the policy analysis of some of these legal
decisions in the war on terror. One can analyze application of cruelty as a
legal matter, but one also should analyze it as to whether it is as a policy
supportive of our larger overarching foreign policy and national security goals.
I was also engaged in that debate in the Pentagon.
DAN RATHER: How much longer were you in the military?
ALBERTO MORA: I left the Department of the Navy in December of
2005.
DAN RATHER: While this was going on, from the moment you raised your
questions and said, "This doesn't look right to me," when you went to the
General Counsel of the Army, your friend, and he showed you the papers, did you
face criticism for raising the questions?
ALBERTO MORA: No. I think what would come as a surprise to most
individuals is that I was never directly criticized for my actions in the
Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. To the contrary, I received
an enormous amount of support from both civilians and career military lawyers
and operators concerning this stance.
Most individuals in the Department of Defense are firmly of the view that
these activities are unlawful, contrary to our national values, and contrary to
our interests in the war on terror.
DAN RATHER: At Guantánamo, knowing what you know, do you believe that
crimes were committed there?
ALBERTO MORA: It's possible that crimes were committed there.
Certainly, if any of this treatment reached the level of torture, I don't think
there would be anybody who would disagree that a crime was committed.
DAN RATHER: And the responsibility for those crimes then would be how
high? Would it stop with the commander of Guantánamo?
ALBERTO MORA: It's hard to say. That would be a difficult question for
me to answer, and one that it would be difficult for me to speculate on. It is
specific to the individual, specific to the acts. If it reached the level of
torture—and that's a fact-specific inquiry—then the ensuring inquiry would be
how high did these authorities go, who knew about this, and who authorized
it.
DAN RATHER: You know, there are many people—and now I'm speaking about
people outside the military, or there may be some inside the military—who say,
"Listen, there has been so muchAbu—Ghraib, what has happened in Guantánamo,
whether you believe that crimes that can be prosecuted were committed or not,
this is not the American way. We have seen the pictures, we have heard the
testimony. How could this happen?" This is the question that gets asked of
journalists very often: "How could this happen without higher-ups, particularly
the highest higher-ups, knowing about it?"
Now, you've been on the inside. Could it happen that they didn't know?
ALBERTO MORA: Oh, absolutely, it could easily happen. Anybody who
reads military history will understand that this occurs in every conflict in all
armed forces. You have the pathological individuals who only too readily apply
brutal treatment to detainees. It happens.
In our case, the case of the United States, the answers are more complex,
because I think what happened here is something we've seen in other conflicts.
For example, during World War II the United States detained 130,000
Japanese-American citizens for the duration of the conflict, even though they
were American citizens and even though the Constitution would hold that you
can't do that. Instead, the Supreme Court endorsed the constitutionality of that
detention.
American history shows that when the nation is attacked and our citizens are
both afraid and angry, then many citizens are willing to bend the rules for what
they perceive to be a measure that is necessary for their safety. I think that
is what happened in this kind of case. We both dehumanized the enemy and,
because we were acting somewhat out of fear, we felt that these measures were
necessary to protect Americans. I think those were the underlying assumptions
and beliefs that led to the application of these measures.
DAN RATHER: Correct me if I'm wrong. Part of what you are telling me
that you learned out of this—perhaps you knew it before—is that fear leads to
anger and anger can lead to extreme acts.
ALBERTO MORA: I think that's right. It's important to recognize that
now. Thankfully, in no small measure because of the aggressive posture of the
President, of the American military, American law enforcement, and American
intelligence agencies, we have not been attacked since 9/11. But I think most
people believe that another attack is not only likely, it's probable at some
point.
I think it is important for us as a nation to understand the consequences of
adopting these kinds of policies now, when we are not under direct attack, when
we are not considering the wisdom of these measures in the backdrop of American
dead. It is during these times of relative tranquility that we can make a cool
assessment of what the cost to the nation would be, so that when that attack
does come again, if it comes again, we are able to make the right calls this
time, unlike the last time.
DAN RATHER: From what you have seen, is there a case to be presented
to an international war crimes tribunal about what happened in Guantánamo and
Abu Ghraib?
ALBERTO MORA: Mr. Rather, I'd prefer not to go down that path. If that
were to be the case, it would be personally painful for me, because it would
involve individuals that I served in the Administration with. Others may go down
that road and seek to answer those kinds of questions, but it's not an inquiry
that I think I would probably be a part of.
DAN RATHER: Well, as you well know, to ask the question is not to
suggest that I know the answer. My common-sense guess is that most Americans
would prefer to handle it in our own judicial system, in our own military, in
our own Department of Defense. But outside the country the question gets asked,
"Why shouldn't this be taken to a war crimes tribunal?"—which you have given
your answer to, that that's not a place where you want to go.
Has this changed you as a person and as a professional?
ALBERTO MORA: I think if it has changed me it is because it has made
me reflect much more deeply into the underpinnings of our Constitution and our
values. As a lawyer, you tend to ask primarily the question "Is it legal?" But
there are situations, such as this one, in which we are talking about U.S.
behavior overseas, where domestic laws don't always apply. Then you have to ask
yourself the question "Is this right behavior, right action, by the United
States?" It causes you to analyze the structure of our beliefs, the structure of
our values, the intersection of our values and our ethics with law. To that
extent, it has made me much more aware of our legal system, our values, and what
it is that we stand for as a nation.
It has also caused me to reflect as to the intersection between law and
foreign policy. Law supports our foreign policy; it is not divorced from it.
Foreign policy is not undertaken or executed in the absence of legal structures.
It's important that we think more about this.
How we behave, whether we treat detainees with cruelty or not, is also to say
how we wish the world to be. If we can apply cruelty to detainees, it is to say
that we would be tolerant of other nations applying cruelty to other individuals
for other reasons. To do that would be to turn our backs on a historic American
vocation, which is to support human dignity, to support human rights, and to
labor for those international institutions that are supportive of these
ventures. If we turn our back on all of this, then the world will be a very
different place, and it would not be as good a place as it is now.
DAN RATHER: You said it's in the nature of being a lawyer, that's what
a lawyer does, to ask the question "Is it legal?" Should it be, or is it, in the
nature of a warrior to ask those same questions?
ALBERTO MORA: Lawyers ask those questions all the time. American
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan take casualties every day because they exercise
restraint, and they exercise restraint in the use of force because it is in the
American nature to protect the innocent and it is the American nature to protect
those who may be innocent even though they may be in a zone of conflict.
When the Marines went into both Iraq and Afghanistan, the commander of the
Marine forces in his message to the Marines urged them on both occasions to
maintain their honor clean, and the message was unmistakable: A Marine will not
use force indiscriminately, will only use force against the enemies of the
nation, will not use methods that we know to be un-American.
So warriors think about that all the time, and that's one of the things that
makes them as effective as they are in fighting our nation's battles.
DAN RATHER: Now I'm asking you to help me with some analysis. How did
we as a country, as a people, reach the point where a lot of people overseas,
outside of our own country, believe that we have deliberately, with malice
aforethought, or certainly with forethought, gone to cruelty and torture as a
matter of foreign policy, military policy, and national policy? How did we get
there?
ALBERTO MORA: Well, for most of our traditional allies—meaning all of
Europe and Canada, Australia, New Zealand, other nations—for them there's no
doubt about it, for them it's crystal clear, that the United States has embarked
on a policy of cruel treatment of detainees and has, as the Parliamentary Union
of the European Community put it, turned our back on our most fundamental
American values.
Any American official, like myself, who traveled
overseas and participated in international fora during the last four and a half
years, was confronted by foreign officials who would accuse us of precisely
these kinds of activities. I've been accused publicly by Colombian supreme court
justices and the chief military officers of the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand of having engaged in violations of the laws of war,
of having betrayed the Geneva Conventions, and of having severely undermined the
very fabric of international law. These are views that are widely, even
universally, held by our traditional allies, and it comes from the acts I've
described and forgetting the boundaries created by the very precedents, the
laws, the institutions, and practices that we have created since World War
II.
DAN RATHER: You've traveled, you said, at least fairly extensively.
How do we climb back to the high ground?
ALBERTO MORA: I think we have started to do that. The adoption of the
McCain Amendments, which prohibit cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, in December 2005 is a very important step in that
direction. It has been reinforced by the Detainee Treatment Act. I think most people are now of the
view that U.S. legislation now very clearly and universally forbids the
application of cruelty to any detainee, regardless of who holds them and
regardless of where that person is held. That is a big step in terms of
regaining our moral authority and returning to the status quo ante.
But there is more that needs to be done. This war on terror is going to go on
for a long time. Our willingness to apply due process to individuals, to treat
people decently and humanely, will be tested in many other ways. The trials of
the detainees in Guantánamo, for example, and the degree of fairness that we
afford them, will be tests of our character and our legal system. We have to be
vigilant about these kinds of matters.
So there will be many more opportunities to be tested and to demonstrate our
return to traditional values in the years ahead.
DAN RATHER: What's the single most important thing, in your opinion,
for the American people to know about the subject of cruel, unusual, torturous
treatment and the allegations that they have been applied to prisoners—the
single most important thing for us to know?
ALBERTO MORA: That's a hard question. I would answer it this way.
First of all, that we have done it, we have applied cruelty to individuals.
Second of all, it is destructive of everything we stand for. And, third of all,
it weakens us in the war on terror; it is false to think for a moment that it
makes us stronger in this war.
DAN RATHER: What question have I not asked you that I should have
asked you?
ALBERTO MORA: I think you've covered them pretty well.
DAN RATHER: Your background is what, just for the record and for
people who haven't read about you or don't know about you? You grew up where,
you went where, what's your political background, educational background?
ALBERTO MORA: I was born in Boston of a Cuban father and a Hungarian
mother. I grew up in Cuba until I was eight, then Mississippi until graduation
from high school. I went to Swarthmore College as an undergraduate, went into
the State Department as a Foreign Service officer, and traveled fairly
extensively.
I would emphasize my Cuban and Hungarian heritage. There is
nobody whose family has lived through communist dictatorships who does not
understand, perhaps with a bit more immediacy than most Americans, what the
absence of the rule of law and the disregard for human dignity would do to a
country. Cruelty is a technique of dictatorships, not a technique that we want
to have any commerce with. So, perhaps because my background embodies an
important segment of those countries, I may be a little more sensitive to these
issues than most individuals.
DAN RATHER: You grew up in Mississippi?
ALBERTO MORA: I did.
DAN RATHER: And went to college and university?
ALBERTO MORA: I went to Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania. Then,
after the State Department, I went to the University of Miami Law School. I
practiced law in Miami as a trial attorney for ten years, and then came back to
Washington to enter the first Bush Administration, where I was General Counsel
of the U.S. Information Agency. I then returned to the private sector. I also
served part-time under President Clinton on the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
So I have been practicing law for over twenty-five years, but over all my entire
lifetime, about a third of it has been in foreign policy positions, both in the
career junior levels to high, appointed positions, under both Democratic and
Republican administrations.
DAN RATHER: Generally speaking, though, in a Democratic administration
one would not become the General Counsel to the Navy without being active in
politics and being considered a Democrat. Now extrapolate from that. In a
Republican administration—this is an appointment a lot of people would like to
have—you don't get that job unless you at least convince somebody that you are a
Republican.
ALBERTO MORA: You're right. I am a Republican. During my early life, I
was on the fence because I saw good and bad things about both parties. But what
happened was, during the Contra years in Central America, when the Democratic Party
refused to support the Contras, as the son of a Cuban father, I felt that I
could no longer entertain any belief that the Democratic Party stood for what I
stood for in the realm of foreign policy. So I joined the Republican Party. Then
I was appointed, as I mentioned, to the first Bush Administration.
But I
was not political in the sense that I had worked in political campaigns or
donated large amounts of money to the candidates. I had never really done any of
that. But I have always affiliated myself more with the Republican ideals in
foreign policy, and to some extent in domestic policy as well.
DAN RATHER: Where I was going with that is it would strike some people
that it may have taken more guts, it may have taken more courage, to take the
position you took as a self-described Republican and a conservative politically,
who might have been expected to go along or get along a little more than most
people.
ALBERTO MORA: I never saw it in that kind of fashion. When I saw the
policy of cruelty in these decisions, among my early thoughts was, "This is
going to hurt the President. The people who supported these kinds of policies
are doing things that are going to hurt my Administration. They are going to
hurt the Navy, the Marine Corps, going to hurt the Department of Defense, going
to hurt the war on terror, going to hurt the nation, but are also going to hurt
the President." My sense was that I was going to get into this policy debate and
I was going to win because I was convinced that these were the better policies
politically as well as for the country.
DAN RATHER: I think we're there. I really appreciate your time. I
found it quite interesting, to say the least. I learned a lot.
ALBERTO MORA: I appreciate the questioning.
DAN RATHER: Congratulations.
ALBERTO MORA: Thank you.
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