"Justice, Culture and Tradition" Conference Abstracts
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, June 2-4, 2008

Charles R. Beitz - "The Moral Standing of States" - Wednesday June 4, 2:00PM - 4:00PM

"The Moral Standing of States" is the title of an article Michael Walzer wrote in response to four critics of the theory of nonintervention defended in Just and Unjust Wars. It states a theme to which he has returned in subsequent work. I offer four sets of comments. First, by way of introduction, I describe the controversy between Walzer and his critics and try to identify the central point of contention. Second, I make some observations about the wider conception of global justice suggested by Walzer’s remarks, emphasizing the extent of the difference between this conception and the traditional view of a "society of states" to which it stands as an alternative. The central value in Walzer’s conception is collective self-determination, so I comment about its meaning and importance. Finally, I consider whether and how concerns about the moral standing of states bear on the kinds of cases of humanitarian intervention that the world community has actually faced since the book and article were written, particularly since the end of the Cold War.

Mitchell Cohen - Round Table: "The Practice of Social Criticism" - Monday, June 2, 3:30 - 6:00pm

"Should we trust intellectuals?" This question will be posed by this presentation, and the assumption is that it comprises one of the most important issues raised by Michael Walzer in his work. "Socializing Criticism" will examine this in several steps, first by looking at why it is so important for a democratic society and for Walzer's project(s). The focus will be on the distinction between "connected" and "conventional" criticism; Walzer's arguments will be linked to a certain kind of left. The presentation will also be constructed partly in contrast to competing approaches, including those of John Rawls, Leo Strauss and Edward Said. Finally, some connected questions will be raised.

Michael Doyle - Roundtable: "The Just War Theory - Moral and Legal Perspectives" - Tuesday, June 3rd, 2:00 - 5:00pm

Nonintervention has been a particularly important and occasionally disturbing principle for liberal statesmen and scholars, such as Michael Walzer, who share a commitment to basic and universal human rights. On the one hand, Liberals have provided sfome of the very strongest reasons to abide by a strict form of the nonintervention doctrine. It was only with a security of national borders that liberals such as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill thought that peoples could work out the capacity to govern themselves as free citizens. On the other hand, those very same principles of universal human dignity when applied in different contexts have provided justifications for overriding the principle of nonintervention. In explaining this dual logic I present an interpretive summary of J.S. Mill's famous argument against and for intervention, presented in his "A Few Words on Nonintervention" (1859/1973). I stress, more than has been conventional, the consequentialist character of the ethics of nonintervention and intervention. It makes a difference whether we think that an intervention will do more good than harm and some of the factors that determine the outcome are matters of strategy and institutional choice. I also engage in one-sided debate with Mill as I explore the significance of the many historical examples Mill employs to support his argument. Do they actually support his conclusions. Could they—given what he knew or should have known, given what we now think we know? My conclusion will be that, persuasive as the moral logic of his liberal intervention sometimes is, the facts of the particular cases he cites actually tend to favor a strong bias toward nonintervention.

Ruth Gavison - "The Moral Standing of States" - Wednesday, June 4th, 2:00PM - 4:00PM

I present and analyze Walzer's position on the scope and justification of seeing states as having moral standing in the context of criticisms made against him that he allows too much autonomy and immunity for states, which violate core human rights of their population or parts of them.

I argue that in fact it is mere proper to describe his position—which I endorse—not just as granting moral status to states but as one of taking states seriously (TSS). In terms of the fashionable human rights discourse (HRD)—states are more than tools through which core individual human rights—important as they are—are defended. They have social functions which are independent of this protection and in a way presuppose it. Taking states seriously may in fact be a better way to promote the complex ideal of taking rights seriously. Consequently, the question is not only whether Walzer balances well between states and rights. While states may indeed at times be major violators of rights (or at least facilitators of their violation), they more often are necessary conditions for protection of both basic interests and rights of individuals and groups.

The paper has four parts.

• Part I expounds Walzer's position on the moral standing of states and its justification;
• Part II locates this principle within broader aspects of Walzer's political philosophy and of his way of doing political philosophy;
• Part III examines some key ambiguities in his theses, and their implications to the understanding and evaluation of his theory about the relations between states, governments, communities and rights.
• Part IV argues that despite these ambiguities, Walzer's frame of reference is indeed very useful and fruitful in understanding and evaluating claims made by states and groups within them concerning the proper scope and justification of intervening in the 'internal affairs' of states. I illustrate this utility and fruitfulness through examining some of the claims made, by Walzer as well as others, about s state that we both care deeply about—the state of Israel.

Axel Honneth - Round Table: "The Practice of Social Criticism" - Monday, June 2, 3:30 - 6:00pm

In an article bearing the suggestive title "Courage, Sympathy and a Good Eye," Michael Walzer took the debate over the conditions of a critique of society and steered it sharply onto the track of an ethics of virtue (Michael Walzer, "Courage, Sympathy and a Good Eye—Virtues of Social Criticism and the Uses of Societal Theory," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 48 (2000), 5, 709-718). At first sight, the argument he uses to justify this shift seems as plausible as it is timely. He claims that because a theory of society constitutes a neither necessary nor sufficient condition for a successful critique of society, it cannot be judged primarily by the quality of its theoretical content, but by the features of the author. Walzer claims that a critic must demonstrate courage, a capacity for sympathy and a sense of proportion. What makes this conclusion sound so plausible is the fact that the impact of a critique of society seldom derives from the amount of theory invested in it, but from the spontaneous comprehensibility of its central claim. Walzer's attempt to shift our focus toward the virtues of the critic seems so timely because it abets the widespread devaluation of sociological knowledge, while accommodating the contemporary tendency to personalize intellectual issues. Nevertheless, the matter-of-fact way in which Walzer continues to view the intellectual as a born representative of the critique of society is surprising. This is not the bold advocate of enlightenment à la Emile Zola, but that dime-a-dozen author who contributes generalizing arguments to democratic public discourse. Is it really true that this normalized intellectual, this intellectual agent in the forums of public will-formation, remains the natural representative of what was once termed the "critique of society?" In this essay I will first trace the epochal changes that the figure of the intellectual has undergone, and then proceed to sketch a physiognomy of the social critic that differs starkly from the one we find in Walzer's essay.

George Kateb - "Tradition, Radicalism and Solidarity"- Wednesday, June 4th, 10:00-12:15pm

Michael Walzer is a prince of thought. We are indebted to him for a great amount of political theory of surpassing quality. One of his main interests is to determine the nature of social criticism, which is an important part of political theory. "Connected" criticism is one his leading concepts in this area of inquiry. The paper explores Walzer's theory of connected criticism and his practice as a connected critic, but as an apparently unconnected critic as well. He is loyal and devoted to four entities or causes: the United States, Israel, the Jewish people, and the movement of the lower orders and working peoples all over the world. At the risk of being too schematic or reductive, I find that in his loyalty and devotion, Walzer is a connected critic of Israel, the Jewish people, and various leftist movements, but not consistently connected to the United States. The hallmark of Walzer's connectedness is being protective of, and only mildly critical towards, the objects of his loyalty. However, he can be anything but mild when he's protective—that is, he can be selectively radical or even ruthless in his arguments for protective measures. Yet he is protectively anti-radical, in another sense, as when he opposes ideological revolutions led by elites who think themselves more advanced than their following in the lower orders. In not being consistently connected to the United States, he is content to argue for certain ideas of social justice, "hyphenated" pluralism, and war that are radical, in one way or another, and do not grow out of American intellectual traditions. Even more telling, he does not engage enough with the long tradition of both moral and spiritual radicalism that figures in American life from the beginning, and dominates American literature certainly from the middle of the nineteenth century, and even before. By teaching a selective political radicalism that is not in the American grain, and by not engaging with American moral and spiritual radicalism, he places himself at a distance. But he typically discountenances distance.

Will Kymlicka - "Multiculturalism, Civil Society, and the Politics of Recognition" - Tuesday, June 3, 10am - 12:15pm

Title: Categorizing Groups, Categorizing States: Theorizing Minority Rights in a World of Deep Diversity

Jacob T. Levy - "Multiculturalism, Civil Society, and the Politics of Recognition" - Tuesday, June 3, 10am - 12:15pm

Michael Walzer has made great contributions to the appreciation of both moral and cultural pluralism in political theory. Nonetheless, there are ways in which Walzer's arguments appear anti-pluralistic. The question of this essay is: why is there so little pluralism in Walzer's political theory, or why does its pluralism run out so soon? Focusing on Spheres of Justice and "Nation and Universe," it examines the effect of Walzer's nationalism/statism on his theory, and the constraints his theory faces in considering multiculturalism or political pluralist regimes such as federalism within a state.

Menachem Lorberbaum - Round Table: "The Practice of Social Criticism" - Monday, June 2, 3:30 - 6:00pm

The debate surrounding Walzer's conception of political morality and his mode of social criticism has focused on its epistemological assumptions. Walzer's version of the social critic however assumes also a unique political posture. It is this aspect of his conception that I seek to elaborate here. Walzer's idea of social criticism, I will argue, is embedded in a robust conception of politics and of membership. Together they form the circumstances of criticism making it both necessary and possible.

Avishai Margalit -"Tradition, Radicalism and Solidarity"- Wednesday, June 4th 10:00-12:15pm

Some of us, those who where raised in families, for whom a "scab" is the scum of the earth, are still deeply moved by the idea of solidarity. Michael Walzer, for one, was instructed, quite properly, "never to cross a picket line." Like all of us, he may have blurred some lines in his life, but I am sure that he never crossed a picket line. In his youth, he sang "Solidarity Forever," and he remained concerned with issues of solidarity ever since—mainly, with the issue of an individual's choice to express solidarity with a collective. Michael Walzer tries to meet the rhetorical question "Is there anything left to us but to organize and fight? For the union makes us strong."

Expressing solidarity may mean something very strong. It may mean identification with a collective, be it the "the union" or, more disturbingly, "the Party." It may also mean losing one's sense of moral integrity for the sole reason that "the union makes us strong," whereas no force on earth—as the song has it—is weaker than the feeble strength of one individual.

There are two types of politics: effective politics and expressive politics. Effective politics has to do with the exercise of power. Expressive politics has to do with expressing an attitude to the exercise of power. 'Expressing solidarity' is an ambiguous notion: it can be part of expressive politics and it can be part of effective politics.

Jeff McMahan - Roundtable: "The Just War Theory - Moral and Legal Perspectives" - Tuesday, June 3rd, 2:00 - 5:00pm

According to Michael Walzer’s view, the permissions and prohibitions of the law governing the conduct of war coincide very closely with the permissions and prohibitions of morality. In my view, they do not. And there are various reasons why at present the law cannot coincide more closely with morality. The principal obstacles are epistemic: it is, for example, very difficult for combatants to determine whether the war in which they have been commanded to fight is just or unjust. I will argue that in order to achieve greater congruence between the law governing the conduct of war and the morality of war, it will be necessary to do two things: (1) to reform the law governing the resort to war and (2) to provide more authoritative guidance for combatants about whether the wars in which they are commanded to fight are legal or illegal.I will therefore argue for the need for an international court empowered to interpret and administer a more nuanced, morally informed law of jus ad bellum.The existence of such a court would better enable us to hold individuals accountable for matters of jus ad bellum.

David Novak - Round Table: "The Jewish Political Tradition" - Wednesday, June 4th 4:30-6:30pm

In his introduction to the first volume of the projected four volume work, The Jewish Political Tradition, Michael Walzer writes: "We have highlighted especially the emphasis on consent, not only because of its contemporary interest but also because of its early appearance and frequent reiteration in Jewish thought. Even the authority of God's law is often said to rest on a certain kind of consent. Once again, it is necessary to stress that this claim doesn't press Jewish writers toward some version of liberal democracy, but . . . it does make all the varieties of political authoritarianism difficult to defend." (pp. xxviii-xxix)

In this presentation I plan to press Walzer on the question of "liberal democracy." Are the two inextricably linked, i.e., must democracy be liberal in the more current sense of that term? If the idea of liberal democracy makes existential claims upon the members of democratic societies, requiring them to affirm autonomy has the prime factor in human nature, then it is doubtful that the Jewish political tradition, which Walzer himself admits is inextricably theological, has much to offer a liberally constituted democracy. However, I submit that the concepts of free choice and what might be called "voluntary proposal," of which we can find ample manifestations in the Jewish tradition, do provide democratic theory with a better modus operandi than the type of autonomous self-creation espoused by most of today's liberals. In other words, liberal democracy is not the only media res between anarchy and political authoritarianism, especially for Jews, and especially from Judaism for the world.

Brian Orend - Roundtable: "Just War Theory - Moral and Legal Perspectives" - Tuesday, June 3rd, 2:00 - 5:00pm

Title: Justifying Just War Theory: Rights vs. Rules

Walzer's just war theory is brilliant, and massively influential, as we all know. He goes out of his way to insist, many times, that the essential structure of just war theory is that it is a theory of rights—as opposed to one of utilities or virtues. Yet this claim involves him in quandary at several points in his just war theory, leading him for instance to admit that consequentialist appeals must somehow be accommodated. The point of this "big picture" presentation is to examine critically what Walzer believes about the ultimate nature and justification of the principles of just war theory: where do they come from? Of what kind are they? Why should we follow them? I shall then suggest a contrasting reading of the nature and justification of just war theory, viewing it more as a theory of rules than a theory of rights—a set of rules justified not by one but rather by many values (in fact, by a kind of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium between rights, utilities and virtues).

Thomas Scanlon - "Distributive Justice" - Monday, June 2nd, 10:00-12:15pm

A reassessment of Walzer's argument in Spheres of Justice, and of my own initial reaction to it, considering this argument in the light of his earlier discussion of political obligation in Obligations.

Haim Shapira - Roundtable: "The Just War Theory - Moral and Legal Perspectives" - Tuesday, June 3rd, 2:00 - 5:00pm

"There is no Jewish theory of war and peace," stated Michael Walzer in a chapter written by him several years ago. The premature war ethic that can be found in the Jewish tradition suffers from two limitations. First, it is particularistic. The rabbis didn't create a moral framework that might be applied to wars of other nations. A second limitation is conceptual: the rabbis employed only two categories: commanded war and permitted war; they didn't develop a category of prohibited war, which is the basis for a theory of just and unjust wars. As Walzer acknowledged, one reason for these limitations is that the classical discussion in talmudic and medieval sources was theoretical. It was held under the circumstances of exile, when Jews lacked sovereign power and waged no wars. The question I shall discuss is whether that had changed in the course of the twentieth century in light of the national revival that brought Jews back to history and back to use of force. I shall answer this question affirmatively, by describing a new war ethic that can be found in recent halachic writings. These writers developed the missing category of prohibited war and created a universalistic framework that can be applied in international society. I will analyze the strategies they employed in order to develop these new conceptions and consider their implications on the justification of war.

Georgia Warnke – "The Interpretive View of Ethics" - Monday, June 2, 2:00 – 3:00pm

This paper revisits Michael Walzer’s account of social meanings in order to extend it to questions of identity and to explore the relation between identity, social meanings and ethics. Objects such as altars, Walzer argues, have their meanings within a network of actions, practices and beliefs that constructs them as what they are. What about “objects” such as men and women, males and females? How, is it possible that we understand individuals as these identities when we no longer do so within the horizon of shared understandings that constructs them? What follows for questions of justice?