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July 24, 2007
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| Matthew Taylor |
This online conversation between Matthew Taylor, RSA Chief Executive, and Joel Rosenthal, Carnegie Council President, is part of a joint project on the ethics of climate change with the RSA in London and Carnegie Council in New York.
To read the other exchanges in this conversation, click on the links in the right sidebar.
Dear Joel,
I found your thoughts on the ethical case for action against climate change very interesting. Those of us who believe passionately in the need to act can easily conflate these arguments. In so doing we make it easier for sceptics to suggest we are animated more by liberal guilt than scientific evidence or rational analysis. As you are an expert in such matters I hope you will tolerate me exploring further with you the relationship between philosophical ideas and the particular nature of climate change?
Two features of the global warming thesis offer a rationale for citizens in high emission nations like the U.K. and U.S. to refuse to act. The first lies in the science of climate change being contested, either by the small vociferous minority who deny the role of human behaviour, or by those who cite the inherent uncertainty of nature’s feedback mechanisms. The second is the microcosmic impact of any individual’s carbon impact in relation to global levels.
To deal with these rationales the philosophical case needs to be bolstered. The precautionary principle provides an effective response to those who cannot be convinced by scientific prediction. Even if we could not be absolutely certain that human action causes climate change it would be our duty on the grounds you listed in your post to try to mitigate the risks that our behaviour poses to the world, our descendants and other less polluting nations. Criminal negligence can be proven if employers or retailers fail to address even a very small risk. Even the most ardent of climate change sceptics would find it hard to argue that the risk of them being incorrect is so small that the precautionary principle does not apply.
To my view, the argument for inaction that cites the negligible contribution we each individually make to climate change wrongly applies a utilitarian calculus to a moral imperative. If my behaviour is contributing to a harm it is my duty to change that behaviour even if so doing does not in itself stop the harm. Instead of seeing the issue in terms of my contribution to the whole harm, it should be seen in terms of the balance in my life between self-interested and other regarding behaviour. It is reasonable for me to ask whether to reduce my own carbon footprint somehow reduces my capacity to do other forms of good, but the tiny size of my own contribution does not on its own remove my moral duty.
An important counter argument concerns freedom. It can be maintained that restraining people’s choices significantly in order to make only a negligible impact on carbon emissions is disproportionate. Exponents of such a view could argue that it is better to prepare to adapt to the impact of climate change than to take actions now that will significantly restrain our freedom. This is why the case for action has to combine the ethical argument with the effort to achieve carbon reduction without undue constraints of how people choose to live their lives. Technological advances are vital to this, as are the development of more alternative more sustainable and enjoyable ways of living. And this need to give people choice also underlies the RSA’s advocacy of tradable carbon permits enabling countries, companies, communities and individuals to choose how to meet their environmental limits.
And finally, there is a psychological case for tradable permits. We often assume that action is the consequence of hope. But arguably the reverse is equally the case. The attitude of the spectator is one of passivity. By engaging people in thinking creatively about how to live within their carbon limit, we can hope to turn people from passive spectators to active participants in this race to save our planet.
Best wishes,
Matthew
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